Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 8
Issue 3 Spring 1977

Article 8

1977

Antitrust - Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.: A Further
Refinement of Parker's State Action Exemption
Peter D. Coblentz

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
Recommended Citation
Peter D. Coblentz, Antitrust - Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.: A Further Refinement of Parker's State Action Exemption, 8 Loy. U. Chi. L. J.
619 (1977).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol8/iss3/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

ANTITRUST- Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.: A Further Refinement of Parker's State Action Exemption
Since Parker v. Brown' was decided thirty-four years ago, it has
been accepted that through state regulation, private business activity may be afforded a state action exemption from the antitrust
laws. The continuing vitality of this exemption was the question
presented in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.' With the recent exception of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 3 this was the first opportunity
for the Supreme Court to review directly the Parker doctrine,4 and
the first antitrust opinion delivered by Justice Stevens. The Cantor
Court decided that Parker should not be extended to include private
activity subject to state regulation unless it was clear that the decision to implement the anticompetitive activity was indisputably
that of the state. 5 Furthermore, the scope of the state action exemption must be limited to the minimum extent necessary in order to
make the regulatory scheme work.'
The Sherman Act 7 was promulgated to promote and protect a
fundamental national policy-competition . This policy is deemed
to be of such national importance that the Sherman Act has been
often considered to approach constitutional status? The Sherman
Act's significance is further enhanced because it is considered to be
an exercise of congressional authority to the fullest extent possible
under the commerce clause. ° As a result, the Supreme Court has
1.
2.
3.
4.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 958 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Donnem].
5. 96 S. Ct. at 3118.
6. Id. at 3120.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
8. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Pearl Brewing Co. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945, 950 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 693, 702
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Posner].
9. Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of
our fundamental personal freedoms.
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
10. Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formulafor Narrowing Parker v. Brown,
69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 84 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Slater]; see Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 495 (1940).
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declared that exemptions to the antitrust laws are not to be easily
implied."
Contrasted to this important national interest in competition is
the equally compelling and traditional state interest in regulating
matters of local import. This conflict between two countervailing
policies necessitated the compromise reached by the Court in
Parkerv. Brown.'3
THE PARKER v. BROWN STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
In Parkerv. Brown the Court was presented with a state program
for the marketing of California raisins." The express purpose of the
plan was to restrict competition among growers and maintain a
reasonable price level for California raisins.' 5 The court assumed
that such a program would be a violation of the Sherman Act if it
were solely the result of private efforts. However, this program was
the result of a California statute' and the defendants were the California Director of Agriculture and the gubernatorial commission
charged with its administration. Presented with conflict between a
state regulatory statute designed to effectuate a legitimate state
objective, and a potential violation of the antitrust laws, the Court
concluded that the Sherman Act was never intended to prohibit
legitimate state activity.'7 But this determination was qualified by
the requirement that the anticompetitive program derive its authority from the legislative command of the state." Since the activities
of the defendants under the California Prorate Program were directed by the legislature, the Court held the activity impliedly immune from the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. 9
Since Parker v. Brown, federal courts have traditionally refused
11. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485

(1962). See Comment, Gordon v.New York Stock Exchange-The Securities Exchanges'
System of Fixed Commission Rates Is Impliedly Immune from the Antitrust Laws, 7 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 830 (1976).
12. Slater, supra note 10, at 101. See Ladue Local Lines v. Bi-State Development Agency
of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District, 433 F.2d 131, 137 (8th Cir. 1970); Asheville
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959).
13. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 355.
16. California Agricultural Prorate Act, Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stat. 1969.
The statute was designed to prevent ruinous competition among California raisin growers
thereby promoting "economic stability" and conserving the "agricultural wealth" of the
state. 317 U.S. at 355.
17. Id. at 350-52.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 352.
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to impose the strictures of the antitrust statutes upon the states or
upon private action taken pursuant to state regulatory direction.
However, close scrutiny reveals that Parker itself proffers little
clear-cut authority for that proposition. Parker never adequately
articulated either the quality or quantum of state involvement necessary for the creation of a state action exemption. 20 However, courts
later managed to glean from the language of Parkerthe justification
for the extension of its rationale to the activities of private enterprise subject to state regulatory command.
The basic premise in Parker is that the imposition of restraints
as a sovereign act of the state is not the type of agreement or conspiracy which the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.2 ' To the
extent that the state itself conducts the anticompetitive activities
pursuant to a legislative resolution, there is an unquestionably valid
exemption from the antitrust laws.22 The Sherman Act was construed by the Parker Court to be a "prohibition of individual and
not state action." The extension of this state action exemption to
private parties, however, has been the subject of great confusion and
the cause of apparently incongruous decisions. The Supreme Court
directly dealt with this question in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.
There is no explicit authority within Parkerwarranting an extension of the state action exemption to the legislatively sanctioned
activities of a private party. Indeed, the Court attempted to restrict
the exemption. "[A] state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by
declaring that their action is lawful."24
Yet, courts have ignored this restriction,2 relying upon the Supreme Court's finding that the California Prorate Program "derived
its authority and efficacy from the legislative command of the
20. See United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp, 507, 509-10 (D. Ore. 1974);
Verkuil, State Action, Due Process, and Antitrust: Reflections on Parkerv. Brown, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 328, 339 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Verkuil].
Parker,a case which disposed of the antitrust issue as a sidelight, ...
is too narrow
a foundation for the vast body of doctrine which has been based on it.
Posner, supra note 8,at 739.
21. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1942). See Slater, supra note 10, at 72.
22. 317 U.S. at 350-52. See, e.g., New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363,
369-370 (9th Cir. 1974).
23. 317 U.S. at 352.
24. Id. at 351; Slater, supra note 10, at 73.
25. See Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062, reh. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972); Washington Gas Light
Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1971); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Comment, Alabama Power Company v.
Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc., 55 VA. L. REv. 325, 345-46 (1969).
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state." 6 Disregarding the fact that the legislative command in
Parker was directed toward state officials, later courts have exempted private business from the antitrust laws where the business
activity was subject to state regulation. Because the Parker Court
made it clear that state authorization does not automatically immunize those who violate the Sherman Act, courts have inferred
that the state action exemption is derived from the quality and force
of the pertinent regulatory statute," and not merely from the identity of the defendant. 8
The Court in Parker did not foreclose the possibility of a future
extension of the state action exemption to private activity taken at
the direction of the state. However, it is equally clear that Parker
does not, of itself, mandate such an extension. The Supreme Court
left a gap in the Parker doctrine, a gap which was allowed to go
unfilled for over thirty years. Consequently, invocation of Parker in
subsequent decisions to span this gulf has only precipitated an inconsistency of results.29
Regardless of any deficiency in Parker, it remains the foundation
and starting point for any discussion of the application of the state
action exemption. The state action exemption has been deemed to
include private activity performed under the compulsion of state
regulatory statutes.30 This extension of Parker resulted from later
courts' extrapolation of its underlying rationale. Parker was basically an attempt to harmonize the interests of the several states with
the federal government's interest in preserving competition.' The
32
Court explicitly recognized this conflict between dual sovereigns.
The real consideration was to what extent the maintenance of this
dual system required an accommodation of these conflicting poli33
cies.
26. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 788 (1975); Duke & Company Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1279 (3d Cir. 1975);
United States v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
27. See Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062, reh. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972); Slater, supra note 10, at
73.
28. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3132-33 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). But see id. at 3117.
29. Compare Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 298 F. Supp.
1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
30. Posner, supra note 8, at 697-98. "'State action' within the meaning of Parkeris action
either by a state agency or by private firms under compulsion of a state agency." Id at 720.
31. Slater, supra note 10, at 101; Posner, supra note 8, at 704. Cf. Hecht v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
32. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
33. Slater, supra note 10, at 108.
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A prerequisite to any valid state action exemption is that the
regulation must be within an arqa of legitimate state concern.3
Parker recognized that the states have a genuine interest in regulating areas of public concern, even to the extent of eliminating competition in an entire area of the state economy. Since enforcement
of the antitrust laws cannot coexist with valid anticompetitive state
regulation, a certain degree of deference to the states was warranted.
When the state has deliberately sought to implement public policy
goals which it deems to be more beneficial to its citizens than competition, 5 the Court determined the antitrust laws should not be
enforced against the states.
This court-created deference depends entirely upon the existence
of an overriding state interest in regulation; the mere intent of the
state to supplant competition with a state-sponsored regulatory
scheme is not sufficient. Otherwise, the exemption would permit the
state to neutralize an important national concern without an
equally compelling state interest. The entire rationale behind the
state action exemption is to allow the states to impose regulatory
schemes in areas where they have an interest comparable to the
federal interest in competition. This element is essential and common to all of the cases in which a state action exemption has been
allowed .3
PARKER'S PROGENY

In creating this state action exemption, the Court narrowly con37
strued the Sherman Act to avoid a conflict with state sovereignty.
The question posed and left largely unanswered was to what extent
the antitrust laws and the national policy favoring competition
should defer to state-regulated private activity. The criteria developed by Parker were totally inadequate for the development of a
consistent approach to this problem. 3 Consequently, the burden of
discerning congressional intent and developing workable guidelines
fell to the lower courts.
34. In Parker v. Brown, California had a legitimate interest in the welfare of its farmers
and in the conservation of its agircultural wealth. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d
931, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. BiState Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District, 433 F.2d 131, 137
(8th Cir. 1970); Donnem, supra note 4, at 967.
35. Posner, supra note 8, at 715; Slater, supra note 10, at 91.
36. E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
37. Posner, supra note 8, at 699. See also Slater, supra note 10, at 108.
38. Slater, supra note 10, at 73, 108; Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review,
72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Handler].
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Minimum State Supervision
One line of judicial reasoning focused upon the identity of the
party ultimately making the decision to implement the anticompetitive policy." Thus, when activities are "subjected to meaningful
regulation and supervision by the state . . .they are the result of
the considered judgment of the state regulatory authority."40 An
example of this type of analysis can be found in the public utility
rate-making process. Even though anticompetitive rates are proposed by the regulated industry, they may be exempt from the
antitrust laws. The state's involvement in the rate-making process
and supervision of the public utility transforms the individual action into state action for antitrust purposes. Such participation in
the process, coupled with active supervision, was more than the
mere authorization to violate the Sherman Act condemned in
Parker."
This construction of the doctrine was carried to its logical extreme
in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.42
Even though the state regulatory commission never exercised any
effective supervision over the utility's allegedly anticompetitive
practices, the Fourth Circuit exempted the electric company since
its practices were "at all times within the ambit of regulation" of a
3
state agency.
Few courts have ventured as far as the Fourth Circuit did in
Washington Gas Light. However, the decision highlights some of the
rationale's failings. Principally, these decisions fail to evaluate the
relative importance of the state interest being protected with reference to the national interest being thwarted. Using this approach,
courts could exempt private activity on the basis of minimal state
involvement. Under this reasoning, the simple creation of a state
agency with review power would be sufficient to exempt the private
business from the antitrust laws. The court never has to consider the
presence of actual, effective regulation. Although this analysis may
be procedurally convenient, it does not accurately reflect the rationale behind the state action exemption. Congress certainly could not
39. See Slater, supra note 10, at 91-95.
40. Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062, reh. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972).
41. Id. See Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). In
Asheville, the court declared that failure of the state to supervise rates which were the result
of private action would not be "state action" within the meaning of Parker. See also Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
42. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
43. Id. at 252.
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have intended that the antitrust laws be nullified by any state regulation. Unless the regulatory scheme clearly evinces a state purpose
to supplant competition with its own regulation, the federal interests should control.
Intentional Substitution of Regulation
Another test of adequate state involvement for exemption of private activity was presented in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc." The First Circuit rejected the assertion
that action by any public official automatically confers exemption;4 5
the court observed that "the assertion that an act is valid governmental action suggests inquiry rather than ends it."" Thus, an investigation into the extent and quality of state involvement in the
allegedly anticompetitive private activity is required. 7 The Whitten
court determined that a state action exemption should exist, "only
when government determines that competition is not the summum
bonum in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an
alternate form of public regulation." 8
Whitten, and cases like it, clearly indicate that an essential element for the creation of a state action exemption is the intentional
substitution by the state of regulation for competition. 9 This substantially narrows the field in which the states can impart a state
action exemption to the activities of private parties. However, many
courts still fail to weigh the competing interests, i.e., if the state
interest is legitimate, the court will not inquire into its significance
relative to the national interest in competition. This tendency has
drawn the criticism of commentators 0 and accentuates a continuing
inconsistency of results. Nevertheless, this position was accepted by
the majority of courts prior to Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.51
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
In Goldfarb, the Fairfax County Bar published a fee schedule
which provided a suggested minimum fee for title examinations.
44. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
45. Id. at 30.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Duke & Company Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); New Mexico v.
American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
50. Slater, supra note 10; Donnem, supra note 4; Posner, supra note 8; Verkuil, supra note
20.
51. 421 U.S. 773 (1975); see Comment, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: ProfessionalLegal
Services Are Held to be Within the Ambit of Federal Antitrust Laws, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 254
(1976).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

Although the fee schedule purported to be advisory only,52 the plaintiff was unable to find any lawyer who would charge a price less than
that "suggested" by the County Bar. Consequently, the plaintiffs
brought a class action suit against the State and County Bars alleging that the operation of the minimum fee schedule constituted
price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.
Both the Virginia State Bar and the Fairfax County Bar raised
the defense that their actions wefe state action and thereby exempted from the antitrust laws. The State Bar sought shelter within
the Parkerdoctrine by virtue of its status as a state agency. Further,
the State Bar argued that its fee schedule reports and ethical opinions were merely designed to effectuate the fee provisions of the
ethical codes adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court. The County
Bar also claimed its actions were "prompted" by a state agency and
therefore were state action within the meaning of Parker v. Brown. 53
The United States Supreme Court expressly recognized that Virginia has a compelling state interest in the practice of law within
its borders and has the power to regulate that practice for the benefit of its citizens. 4 Furthermore, the Court declared that it did not
intend to undermine Virginia's authority to regulate its professions.
Nevertheless, the Court held that neither the County Bar nor the
State Bar were exempted from the Sherman Act by virtue of state
action. The Court stated that the "threshold inquiry. . is whether
the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." Since the
Virginia Supreme Court's ethical codes contained no direction to
either the State or the County Bar to supply minimum fee sched52. The Virginia Supreme Court is authorized by the State of Virginia to regulate the
practice of law. VIRGINIA CODE ANN. § 54-48 (1974). In performing this function, that court
had adopted various ethical codes dealing in part with attorney's fees and advisory fee
schedules. These canons allowed lawyers to consider advisory fee schedules and fees customarily charged in a locality in setting their own charges. Code of Professional Responsibility,
211 Va. 295, 302 (1970). However, the Virginia Supreme Court specifically stated that fees
for legal services should not be controlled by such schedules. Rules for Integration of the Bar,
171 Va. xxiii (1938).
The Virginia State Bar is statutorily constituted as a state administrative agency through
which the Virginia Supreme Court regulates the practice of law. VIRGINIA CODE ANN. § 54-49
(1972); 421 U.S. at 789-90. Apparently, the State Bar had the power to issue ethical opinions
concerning compliance with this regulation. In its role as a state agency, the State Bar sought
to implement the fee provisions of the Supreme Court's ethical codes. The ethical opinions
and fee schedule reports which emerged as a result of this effort did not compel adherence to
minimum fees, but did threaten professional sanctions against those attorneys who habitually
disregarded their suggestions. 421 U.S. at 791, n.21. This action by the State Bar induced
the Fairfax County Bar to provide the fee schedules which were the root of the controversy
in Goldfarb.
53. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
54. Id. at 792-93.
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ules, 5s the Court concluded that their activities had not been required by the State of Virginia.
The criterion espoused in Goldfarb is that there can be no state
action exemption unless it can be said that the private anticompetitive activity was required by the state. This basically embraces the
standard adopted by earlier courts that the state must consciously
seek to supplant competition, but goes further adding a note of
compulsion. The Court failed to elucidate exactly what would constitute such a state requirement disposing of the glut of ambiguous
and inconsistent criteria by developing a one-word test. Unfortunately, as many meanings could be attributed to "required" as were
6 Apparently,
attributed to "necessary" in McCulloch v. Maryland."
dissatisfied with the one-word catch-phrase, the Court seized the
opportunity in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.5 7 to fashion a new test.
CANTOR'S RESTRICTION OF PARKER

Detroit Edison is a public utility and the sole supplier of electricity to five million people in southeastern Michigan. It also supplies
approximately fifty percent of the standard light bulbs most frequently used by its customers.58 Detroit Edison provides these bulbs
free of charge; the expense is incorporated into the rate which all
consumers must pay for their electricity. The rates, including the
omission of any separate charge for the light bulbs, had been approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission and could not
5
be changed without prior Commission approval. 1
Plaintiff, a retail druggist whose trade also consists of the sale of
light bulbs, alleged the utility's monopoly in the distribution of
electricity was used to restrain competition in the sale of light
bulbs. 0 The plaintiff claimed that the light bulb program foreclosed
competition in a substantial segment of the light bulb market."' The
55. The liability of the Virginia State Bar resulted from the disciplinary action threatened
in its ethical opinions against attorneys who deviated from the prices set by the County Bar's
fee schedule. The Court concluded that the activities of the defendants resulted in pricefixing in violation of the Sherman Act.
56. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
57. 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
58. Id.
59. The Michigan Public Service Commission is a statutorily created state agency
charged with "complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all utilities in the state . ... "
The Commission has the express power "to regulate all rates, fares, fees, charges, services,
rules, conditions of service and all other matters pertaining to the formation, operation, or
direction of such public utilities." MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 460.6 (1967); 96 S. Ct. at 3114.
60. 96 S. Ct. at 3112.
61. Plaintiff claimed that Detroit Edison's light bulb exchange program was a violation
of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), and of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
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Supreme Court assumed that an antitrust violation would exist
unless it found that Michigan's regulation of Detroit Edison was
within a narrow antitrust exemption. The precise issue facing the
Court was whether the Parker doctrine immunizes private action
approved by a state which must continue while that approval remains effective.6"
The Court held that Parker v. Brown was not dispositive of the
issues presented in Cantor." In addition, the Court determined that
the Parker rationale could not be extended to include private activity approved by the state, regardless of the fact that the program
could not be eliminated without prior approval of the Michigan
Public Service Commission. 4 Consequently, Detroit Edison was
denied the protection of a state action exemption, despite the fact
that any unilateral decision on its part to discontinue the program
would have violated state law. 5
In his plurality decision, Justice Stevens re-examined Parkerand
its progeny, placing special significance on the fact that all the
Parkerdefendants were state officials. In Parker,there was no claim
that any private citizen or business had violated the antitrust laws.
Thus, Parker never reached the issue of whether an exemption from
the Sherman Act should be created for private activities approved
or required by the state." Consequently, Parkeralone did not specifically support the proposition raised in Cantor-a private business
can be exempt from the antitrust laws by virtue of state action.,7
Examining the history of Parker,the Court in Cantor relied upon
evidence that the federal government, as amicus curiae, did not
contest California's claim that the Sherman Act was never intended
to proscribe the activities of a sovereign state. Attempting to protect its antitrust enforcement concerns, the Government drew a
clear distinction between anticompetitive conduct by the state itself
and private actions taken pursuant to a state statute. The Govern14 (1970). Plaintiff also alleged that this program constituted a tying arrangement in violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
62. 96 S. Ct. at 3112.
63. Id. at 3114-17.
64. Id. at 3117-21.
65. Id. at 3114.
66. Id. at 3117.
67. Id. It should be noted that Chief Justice Burger dissented from this portion of the
Court's decision in his concurring opinion. Burger disagreed that the holding in Parker could
be limited to suits against state officials. Id. at 3123 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
68. Id. at 3116. The dissent questioned the propriety of any inquiry into the briefs submitted by the contending parties in Parker v. Brown. The dissent opined that such a practice
would undermine the "plain meaning" of the Court's decision. Id. at 3130 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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ment claimed that private activity conducted pursuant to a state
statute, either permitting or requiring such conduct, was the type
of behavior intended to be proscribed by the Sherman Act and
would be clearly illegal."9
Justice Stevens determined that the Parker Court was persuaded
by the Government's argument and that it accepted the concession
that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply to the states and
their activities. However, since the Parker controversy only concerned the activities of state agents, that Court did not address the
question of whether private action taken pursuant to a state statute
could ever be subjected to the antitrust laws. With reference to the
Parker decision, Justice Stevens concluded: "The Court's narrow
holding also prescinded any question about the applicability of the
antitrust laws to private action taken under color of state law." 70
While Justice Stevens concedes that "state action" can be
broadly construed to include private activity in which the state is
involved, he concluded that such a construction was not intended
by Chief Justice Stone in Parker.7 ' Therefore, the Cantor Court
72
found Parker v. Brown inapposite to the issues raised in Cantor.
Despite Justice Stevens' somewhat dubious reliance upon selected portions of the briefs submitted in Parker, it is evident that
the Parker Court was not required to consider whether the antitrust
laws were intended to be applicable to private action taken under
the color of state law. Parker v. Brown was a case which disposed
of the antitrust issues as a side-light73 and is too narrow a foundation
for the vast body of doctrine which claims its justification from that
decision.7 4 In his discussion of Parker, Justice Stevens recognized
69.
70.
71.
"state

Id. at 3116.
Id. at 3117.
Id. Justice Stevens also made note of the fact that thirteen references were made to
action" in Parker v. Brown. Justice Stevens interpreted the language in these references as having been carefully chosen so as to limit the holding to official action only and
not to private action supported, approved or directed by the state. Id. at 3117 n.24.
72. Id. The dissent took issue with the determination by the Court that the only issue
decided by Parker was that a sovereign state itself is not subject to the antitrust laws. The
dissent claimed that such a view would "trivialize that case to the point of overruling it
.
...
Id. at 3129 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
73. The California statute placed restrictions upon the marketing of raisins, 95% of which
find their way into interstate commerce. The Court was primarily concerned with whether
such a program could be reconciled with the federal government's exclusive power to regulate
interstate commerce under the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. Whether "state
action" was intended to be subject to the proscriptions of the Sherman Act was an issue not
raised until the case reached the United States Supreme Court. Even then, the issue was
argued only at the request of the Court. Eventually, the issue was disposed of in three pages
of the Court's opinion.
74. Posner, supra note 8,at 739.
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that it was of limited precedential value with respect to the issue
raised in Cantor. However, he also acknowledged that the state
action exemption was not solely dependent upon the language used
in Parker, but upon the continued vitality of the rationale underlying that decision.7"
CANTOR: THE NEW CRITERIA

The only real issue presented in Cantorwas articulated by Justice
Stevens as "whether the Parkerrationale immunized private action
which has been approved by a State and which must be continued
while state approval remains effective."7 Having already determined that Parker had no direct bearing upon this issue, Justice
Stevens proceeded to present the possible justification for the extension of the Parkerrationale to private parties and the criteria which
the state regulation would be required to meet. The justification
proffered took the form of a two-pronged test:
First, if a private citizen has done nothing more than obey the
command of his state sovereign, it would be unjust to conclude
that he has thereby offended federal law. Second, if the State is
already regulating an area of the economy, it is arguable that Congress did not intend to superimpose the antitrust laws as
an addi77
tional, and perhaps conflicting, regulatory mechanism.
State Domination of the Decision-Making Process
The first part of this two-pronged test focuses upon the regulatory
decision-making process. At the outset, the Court recognized obedience to a state command as clearly permissible activity.7 1 Seemingly, this comports with the criteria developed in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar. Goldfarb established that an exemption for private
conduct will exist only where that conduct is required by the state
acting in its capacity as sovereign. 79 Both statements connote that
compulsion is the relevant consideration. However, Justice Stevens
appreciates that few, if any, parties do nothing more than obey a
state command. Indeed, Justice Stevens states that such instances
of statutorily required private conduct "typically . . . involve a
blend of private and public decisionmaking." 0 The implication is
75. Following his discussion of Parker v. Brown, Justice Stevens devoted the major portion of the opinion to a consideration of whether the Parker rationale should be extended to
immunize Detroit Edison's light bulb program.
76. 96 S. Ct. at 3114.
77. Id. at 3117.
78. Id.
79. 421 U.S. at 790.
80. 96 S. Ct. at 3118.
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that any participation in the decision-making process by the private
business would constitute more than simple obedience. Consequently, this would disqualify the business from enjoying a state
action exemption. The Cantor plurality would institute a more
stringent test than that contemplated in the Goldfarb decision.
Justice Stevens buttressed this analysis by referring to specific
prior instances where the Court held that mere state authorization,"
approval, 2 encouragement, 3 or participation"4 in anticompetitive
conduct conferred no immunity upon private businesses." ' All of
these cases involved a blend of private and public decision-making
in the initiation and enforcement of a particular state program."
Moreover, in each instance, the business exercised sufficient freedom of choice in its participation in the anticompetitive program to
justifiably hold it responsible for its conduct. 7 In furthering this line
of decisions, Cantor holds a private party responsible for its anticompetitive conduct whenever its participation in the state
decision-making process is more than cursory.
Essentially, Cantor is saying that the decision to employ anticompetitive practices must unequivocally be that of the state to cloak
private enterprise with an antitrust exemption. If private business
has a hand in the final decision, then it seems the program is considered a private scheme conducted with state approval. The Court
will not give such a plan the benefits of state sovereignty, but instead holds the parties accountable under the antitrust laws.
Detroit Edison was responsible, as are most public utilities, for
the proposal of tariffs to the public utility commission. The light
bulb program was submitted to the Commission as part of the utility's tariff proposal. Consequently, Detroit Edison and not the Commission exercised the option to create the light bulb program.8 5 Although Detroit Edison could not discontinue the program without
prior Commission approval, it was free to present a new tariff excluding the light bulb program. 0 If the Commission rejected such a
81. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 297, 346 (1904).
82. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
83. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
84. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
85. 96 S. Ct. at 3118.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. This criterion brings to mind the test applied by prior circuits which turned upon the
question of where the ultimate decision-making authority lay. See text accompanying notes
42-44, supra. That rule, however, mandated a much shallower Court consideration than is
required by Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
89. Id. at 3118.
90. Id. at 3114.
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tariff and ordered Detroit Edison to continue the program, that
would, presumably, have qualified Detroit Edison for a state action
exemption under the first part of the new, two-pronged test. The
decision to continue the anticompetitive activities would have
rested solely with the state. However, Detroit Edison never sought
to eliminate the light bulb program and forced the Court to examine
the utility's involvement in the rate-making procedure.
The Court concluded that Detroit Edison's participation in the
rate-making process was "sufficiently significant" to require conformity to federal antitrust laws.9 In effect, a regulated business
which has the power to choose whether to pursue potentially anticompetitive programs must now consider the antitrust implications
of its decision. The regulated business cannot reap the benefits of
state action protections when that business has opted to pursue
anticompetitive activites. The Court reasoned that a regulated business which has chosen to participate in an anticompetitive regulatory scheme is in a situation substantially similar to that of an
unregulated business. Since the unregulated enterprise must cope
with the antitrust implications of its activities, the regulated enterprise must likewise consider the antitrust proscriptions before engaging in the regulatory program.
The Court ameliorates this decision somewhat by admitting that
"there may be cases in which the State's participation in a decision
is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible for his conduct implementing it .
*..."" But this concession is at best chimeric. If the decision-making process is dominated
by the state, the private party has no option to refuse participation
in the regulatory program. This melioration is merely a semantic
juxtaposition of the Court's first prerequisite. When a state dominates the decision-making process, it clearly presents a situation
where the regulated enterprise has "done nothing more than obey a
state command." Regardless of how the state domination question
is determined, its resolution is a prerequisite for the ultimate application of the state action exemption. Failure to satisfy this part of
Cantor's two-pronged test precludes consideration of the delimiting
second part of the test.
Limiting the Scope of the Exemption
The second part of this test concerns the extent a private party's
activities may be exempted from the antitrust laws by virtue of
91.
92.

Id. at 3119.
Id.
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"state action." For the Court, a state action exemption will be implied only if an exemption is necessary to the continued effectiveness of the state regulation "only to the minimum extent necessary." 93 The Court rejected the argument that the mere existence of
pervasive state regulation in an area of the economy should automatically exempt a private regulatee from the antitrust laws. 4 Justice Stevens proffered three reasons for this determination:
(1) compliance with both state regulation and the antitrust
laws does not necessarily demand satisfaction of inconsistent standards;
(2) the inevitable subordination of the federal interest to state
interests is not acceptable; and
(3) since the light bulb market in Michigan is essentially unregulated, even the opposite conclusion as to congressional intent
would not foreclose the enforcement of the antitrust laws as against
Detroit Edison's light bulb program. 5
This approach is premised upon what the Court found to be the
intent of Congress in passing the Sherman Act.9 Congress did not
contemplate state regulatory agencies having greater power to exempt private conduct from the antitrust laws than that given federal regulatory agencies. 7 As a result, the second prong of the
Cantor test is identical to the standards used to measure federal
regulatory legislation for purposes of implying exemptions to the
antitrust laws." Although more restrictive than the tests promulgated by Parker's progeny, the Court believed these new criteria
do not foreclose a state action exemption to a properly situated
business. 9
Noncompetitive vs. Competitive Market Areas
The Court contends that compliance with both state regulatory
93. Id.at 3120.
94. Detroit Edison claimed that the Parker rationale essentially teaches that the federal
antitrust laws were not meant to be applied to areas of the economy which are pervasively
regulated by state agencies. It was asserted "that the competitive standard imposed by
antitrust legislation is fundamentally inconsistent with the 'public interest' standard widely
enforced by regulatory agencies.
Id. at 3119.
95. Id.
96. The dissent was critical of the Court's reliance upon congressional intent for its failure
to reveal the sources of its divinations. For further discussion of congressional intent, see text
accompanying notes 128-134 infra.
97. 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
98. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 683 (1975); Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
99. The Court expressly assumed that there are situations in which the existence of state
regulation should give rise to an implied exemption. 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
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statutes and the federal antitrust laws does not necessarily demand
satisfaction of inconsistent standards. 0 All economic regulation
does not necessarily suppress competition; indeed, regulation may
serve to restore competition or its beneficial aspects to the economy.
For example, regulation of public utilities is based upon the assumption that a private firm controls a natural monopoly making
public controls necessary to reinstate the salubrious effects of competition.'' A public utility can conform with state regulatory statutes in the operation of its natural monopoly while complying with
the federal antitrust laws when it competes in other areas of the
economy. Since the light bulb market was not related to Detroit
Edison's natural monopoly in the production and distribution of
electricity, the utility was forced to comply with the antitrust laws
in the sale of light bulbs-a competitive market. 02
The Court's use of public utilities and natural monopolies as an
illustration of this principle is unfortunate. The language strongly
implies that state regulation can provide an exemption only in noncompetitive areas of the economy. 0 3 This implication, if accepted,
would virtually limit the existence of a state action exemption to
public utilities only. But state regulation of public utilities is a
practice of such long standing that few would advocate the imposition of competition upon them. 04 The result is logical; the state
action exemption would be restricted to those enterprises which are
excused from competition, and the exemption would essentially be
eliminated.
This result must be discredited. A closer examination of the language and tone of the opinion dissuades one from such an anamolous conclusion. Preceding the illustration, Justice Stevens cited
Parker as an example of "economic regulation in which the very
purpose . . .is to avoid the consequences of unrestrained competition."' 10 Use of a non-monopolistic industry was at least an indication that the exemption can apply to state regulation expressly restraining competition.'06
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, also criticized the use of the public
utilities illustration. He read Justice Stevens' analysis as allowing
100.
denied,
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 3119. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
But see the minority's discussion of this line of reasoning, id. at 3135 n.13.
Id. at 3120.
See id. at 3135 n.13.
See generally Donnem, supra note 4.
96 S. Ct. at 3119.
Id.
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the exemption in those cases where state regulation is intended to
restrain competition, while denying the exemption where the purpose is "duplicating the effects of competition-i.e., keeping prices
down."'' 7 In effect, this construction could reward businesses whose
prices were raised by the suppression of competition while penalizing businesses where the regulation sought to keep prices down. As
aptly recognized by Justice Stewart,' 5° this result would be
untenable. Penalizing an abortive attempt to provide the beneficial
aspects of competition while allowing an exemption for successful
attempts to suppress competition would clearly fly in the face of
congressional intent.
It would seem that the Court simply intended to indicate that a
state action exemption for one purpose, such as the exercise of natural monopoly powers, does not automatically exempt a public utility
from the antitrust laws in other competitive areas of the economy.
In a competitive market, the regulated business in question would
have to qualify for an exemption by separate reference to Cantor's
two-pronged test. Since Detroit Edison was unable to do so in the
light bulb market, the Court was compelled to deny it an exemption. This determination was not based solely upon a characterization of the activity as being within a competitive area of the
economy. The Court focused on the quality and quantum of Michigan's involvement in the light bulb exchange program and held that
the decision to implement this anticompetitive program must be
irrefutably that of the state. The Court did not propose to foreclose
legitimate areas of public concern from state regulation, be they
competitive or not.
Subordination of Federal Interest
The Court further supported its restriction of the state action
exemption by asserting that "even assuming inconsistency, we
could not accept the view that the federal interest must inevitably
be subordinated to the State's.'"' 9 Thus, the Court refused to permit
the mere possibility of a conflict between state regulation and fed107. Id. at 3135 n.13 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
108. This rationale will not bear its own weight. If compliance with a state
program aimed at suppressing competition in non-monopoly industries-i.e., raising production-cannot give rise to Sherman Act liability, then surely compliance
with a state program aimed at controlling the terms and conditions of service
performed incident to the provision of a "natural monopoly" product cannot give
rise to treble damages.

Id.
109.

Id. at 3119.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

eral antitrust policy to suggest an exemption to the antitrust laws."10
While admitting that there are instances where a state program
warrants an implied exemption,"' the Court stated that the standards used for ascertaining the exemption's scope must be at least
as rigorous as the standards applied when federal regulatory legislation is at issue." 2 Looking to the legislative history of the antitrust
laws, the Court concluded that Congress never intended state regulatory agencies to have greater power to exempt private conduct
'3
from the antitrust laws than do federal regulatory agencies."
The Court has been extremely reluctant to imply antitrust exemptions to parties subject to federal regulation."' Indeed, the
Court will not imply an exemption without first determining that
it is "necessary to make the [regulatory act] work, and even then
only to the minimum extent necessary.""' Applying this standard
in Cantor, the Court found an exemption unwarranted. Specifically,
the Court determined that refusal to imply an exemption for
Detroit Edison's light bulb program would not impair the continued
effectiveness of Michigan's regulation of electric utilities."' The
Court examined the legislation creating the Michigan Public Service Commission and concluded that regulation of such a light bulb
program was not a central purpose of the Commission." 7 Therefore,
implied repeal was not necessary in order to make Michigan's regulatory scheme work." '
In addition, the Court declared that the market for light bulbs in
Michigan was essentially unregulated and that enforcement of the
antitrust laws cannot be foreclosed in such an area of the economy.
Even if Congress intended the antitrust laws to reach those competitive markets pervasively regulated by the state, this is not one of
them." ' This rationale has little significance to the decision in
Cantor or to the future application of the Cantor two-pronged test;
110. Id. at 3120.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975); United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
115. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
116. 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
117. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 460.501 (1967). The Commission's primary function was
to regulate the furnishing of electricity for the production of light, heat and power. Id. at 3114.
118. Recent cases make it clear that the relevant "aspect of the agency's jurisdiction must
be sufficiently central to the purposes of the enabling statute so that implied repeal of the
antitrust laws is 'necessary to make the [regulatory scheme] work.'" Robinson, Recent
Antitrust Developments: 1975, 31 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A., 38, 57-58 (1976); see 96 S. Ct. at
3120 n.37.
119. 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
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however, it may provide a ground upon which this decision could
be distinguished or limited by future courts.
THE DISSENT'S CRITICISM

The dissenting Justices in Cantor argued: (1) the "implied immunity" doctrine was inapposite to cases involving state regulatory
statutes; 20 (2) the errant application of this federal test was simply
"windowdressing" used to conceal judicial "second-guessing" of the
necessity of particular state regulatory provisions; 12' and, (3) the
Court misread the congressional intent of the Sherman Act. 22 For
the dissenters, the second prong of the Court's new test was merely
a "vehicle for ad hoc judicial determinations of the substantive
validity of state regulatory goals . . 123
Justice Stewart first claimed that the federal "implied immunity" test could not be used to accomodate the federal antitrust laws
with inconsistent state regulatory statutes. State, not federal,
courts are the only forum empowered to substantively review state
statutes. 24 The Cantor situation was not analogous to those cases
where a federal regulatory statute may be inconsistent with the
antitrust laws. Where federal statutes are in controversy, federal
courts are fully authorized to harmonize conflicting provisions.
In Cantor, the Court determined if the permitted light bulb program was "necessary" and "central" to the state's regulatory
scheme. Justice Stewart claimed this was an improper review of the
state regulatory statute.
The dissent also termed the proposed process of conciliation as
endorsing a return to the era of substantive due process. 25 This
criticism, however, cannot withstand close scrutiny. Since the state
action exemption is essentially a doctrine of judicial creation, 2 ' the
Supreme Court can clearly modify, limit or entirely eliminate a
120. Id. at 3135. "Implied immunity" is the name given the doctrine and criteria by which
exemptions for federal regulatory legislation may be implied.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3136-40.
123. Id. at 3134.
124. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
125. The dissent finds this a process which "closely resembles the discarded doctrine of
substantive due process." 96 S.Ct. at 3134. However, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. does not
parallel the cases, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which a substantive due
process type of analysis was used. In those decisions, the Court invalidated state regulatory
laws as being inconsistent with vaguely defined perceptions of national policy which existed
primarily in the hearts and minds of the Supreme Court. Cantor can be differentiated due
to the fact that Michigan's regulatory statute conflicts with a specific federal statute representing an established national policy.
126. Slater, supra note 10, at 80.
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construction or doctrine which it has fostered. The refinement of the
Parker doctrine in Cantor was premised upon a construction of the
Sherman Act, not a substantive examination of Michigan's regulatory statute. In exploring the congressional history, the Court found
no intention to exempt private anticompetitive activity unless it
was clear that the state made the actual decision pursuant to a
genuine state interest. To evaluate this genuine state concern, some
inquiry into the "necessity" and "centrality" of the relevant state
statute is required. If the Court was bound by the self-serving assertions of the states, the intent of the antitrust laws could clearly be
thwarted. Consequently, the Court should not be precluded from
engaging in this limited inquiry into the substantive aspects of state
regulatory statutes.'27 Such an inquiry is merely ancillary to enforcement of the antitrust laws as intended by Congress.
Lastly, the dissent criticizes the Court for couching its decision
in terms of congressional intent without substantiating its construction through references to either the legislative history of the Sherman Act or the decision in Parker v. Brown. While the dissent
correctly points out that the Court never fully addressed the intent
behind the Sherman Act, an analysis of its legislative history would
likely be of little help in answering the question posed in Cantor.2"
When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, the commerce clause
was still being construed in an extremely narrow fashion.' There
was little conflict between the respective spheres of federal and state
regulation. Congress, more likely than not, never actually considered whether the activity of the respective states was to be included
within the ambit of the Sherman Act. 3 ' This was implicitly recognized in Parker,where the Court found "nothing in the language of
the Sherman Act which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a
state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.''3 By corollary, there was nothing in the history or language

of the Sherman Act to suggest that it was not intended to proscribe
anticompetitive private activities directed by a state. Congress simply never dealt with the problem.
However, the absence of a congressional mandate should not preclude the Court from reaching the conclusion it did.' 32 The Sherman
127. See Posner, supra note 8, at 704; New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d
363, 369 (9th Cir. 1974).
128. Slater, supra note 10, at 83.
129. See, e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
130. Slater, supra note 10, at 84.
131. 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1941).
132. See Posner, supra note 8, at 704.
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Act regulates industry to the fullest extent of Congress' authority
under the commerce clause. 33a Consequently, state regulation which
"affects" interstate commerce and restrains competition, survives
at the sufferance of Congress. If Congress desired to do so, it could
clarify whether the antitrust laws apply to the states."34 In lieu of
such congressional action, the task falls upon the Supreme Court.
RAMIFICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE NOERR DOCTRINE

A major concern raised in the dissent was the possible ramification of the decision in Cantor upon the Noerr doctrine."' 5 By excluding private enterprises from the state action exemption when their
role in the decision-making process is "sufficiently significant,"',
the Court may penalize the right to petition state governments or
regulatory agencies. For Justice Stewart, the consequences will be
that private businesses subject to state regulation will refuse to
participate in the regulatory process due to the threat of treble
damage liability." 7 Public utility regulation is typically heavily dependent upon the participation of the regulated utility. Withdrawal
of that expertise may imperil the continued efficient and effective
regulation of those industries."' There is a certain appeal and logic
in this argument; however, examination of the Noerr doctrine reveals such fears are unfounded.
Noerr protects concerted activities conducted with the goal of
influencing state legislation. The entire thrust of Noerr is to insure
that the right to communicate special interests to the government
is not infringed by the antitrust laws, even though motivated by a
desire to promote advantageous, anticompetitive legislation. I" The
attempt to influence legislation is immunized by Noerr; the immunity does not extend to private activities conducted as a result of any
133. It has been suggested that a temporary privilege for good faith adherence to state
regulatory requirements should be given which would release the private business from excessive damages. Posner, supra note 8, at 729-32. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.. 324 U.S.
439 (1945); Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1972); McClellan v. Montana-Dakota
Utilities Co., 104 F. Supp. 46 (D. Minn. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 825 (1953).
134. Cf. United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 201 (1939).
135. Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). Noerr created an exemption for combinations and conspiracies designed to influence
legislative action, even if intended to procure anticompetitive legislation.
136. 96 S. Ct. at 3134 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. See Jacobs, State Regulation and the Antitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 221,
232-33 n.43 (1975).
139. Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
135 (1961). See Handler, supra note 38, at 11-12.
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legislation. Although the dissent may be correct in the assertion that
the significance of the Noerr doctrine is diminished, it does not
detract from the fact that private anticompetitive activity in compliance with state law has never been immunized by Noerr alone.
THE IMPACT OF CANTOR

While the situation in 1977 is very different from that in 1942, the
Parker rationale is undoubtedly still valid. However, in the wake of
Parker an increasingly large sector of our economy has been placed
beyond the pale of the antitrust laws with the growth of state regulation.1"0 Conflicting with that growth is an expanding trend toward a
renewed emphasis upon ensuring competition through antitrust enforcement.' A great deal of this state regulation may be of dubious
importance when contrasted with this national policy favoring competition."' Some mechanism beyond the Parker doctrine was
needed to inspect the validity of these state statutes.
Although the Parker Court accepted some anticompetitive activity as a cost of dual sovereignty, Cantor held that the antitrust laws
must take precedence over these qualitatively less important state
interests. To accommodate this shift in emphasis, it was necessary
for the Court to construe the Parker doctrine more restrictively than
earlier lower courts.' Since state regulatory interests and the antitrust laws could not be expanded to their maximum limits simultaneously, it was clear that one interest would have to yield to the
other. Inevitably, the state interest in regulation was forced to retrench. Viewed from this perspective, the decision in Cantor is
clearly consonant with a 1977 interpretation of the Parkerdoctrine.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Brown nurtured a
doctrine whose vitality has been gradually eroded through a succession to maneuvers by courts suspicious of a tenet which allows states
to nullify a primary federal policy. Cantor v. DetroitEdison Co. was
the natural extension of this trend, resulting inevitably in a highly
restricted Parker doctrine. Cantor will require that the state be the
initial, dominant force behind the decision to implement an anti140, Donnem, supra note 4, at 950-58; Slater, supra note 10, at 74-78.
141. Note the recent repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, ch. 690, § 1, 50 Stat. 693
(repealed 1975); and the McGuire Act of 1952, ch. 745, §§ 2-5, 66 Stat. 631 (repealed 1975),
which gave the states the right to enact fair trade laws. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,
P.L. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1976).
142. See Donnem, supra note 4, at 950-58.
143. See text accompanying notes 37-56 supra.
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competitive policy; otherwise, the regulated business must operate
within the proscriptions of the antitrust laws. As a consequence, a
plethora of state regulatory laws are bound to come under scrutiny
by both state legislatures and private businesses subject to such
regulation. Repeal of regulatory legislation may be one result, with
confusion being a major by-product of Cantor. In any event, Cantor
will certainly result in a larger section of the economy being exposed
to the beneficial effects of the antitrust laws; however, the somewhat equivocal language of the decision may retard total application. Because the language in Cantor is susceptible to a variety of
interpretations, an evenhanded application of its rationale may
have to await further explication by the Supreme Court. Hopefully,
the Supreme Court will not wait another thirty-four years before
again addressing this issue.
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